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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To describe and analyse the cigarette
smuggling trade in Belgium and its role in the international
cigarette black market.
Design: Analysis of Belgian customs and prosecution files
concerning the cigarette smuggling trade in the period
2000 to 2006 and interviews with law enforcement
authorities and private tobacco industry.
Results: Analyses were made of the geographical
aspects, the modus operandi and the participants of the
cigarette smuggling trade in Belgium. Belgium is mainly a
transit country. The cigarettes are transported via the
fine-meshed Belgian highway network to the UK, which is
often the destination country of the cigarettes. China is
the most popular country of origin, especially for
counterfeited cigarettes. In order to transport the
cigarettes often use was made of legal transport
companies and warehouses were frequently used to store
the cigarettes. Many of the persons involved in the
Belgian cigarette smuggling trade are strongly connected
to legitimate business activities.
Conclusions: Belgium is an important transit country for
cigarette smuggling to the UK. This study pictures the
illicit tobacco trade as a complex, ambiguous phenom-
enon involving several legal and illegal participants
whereby the transit of cigarettes across the licit/illicit
divide is paralleled by the moral careers of those who
smuggle them, not to mention those who consume them.
From the legal world to the illegal and back again, this
trade and its practitioners and customers blur the line
between criminality and non-criminality. Dealing with this
phenomenon therefore requires more than a strategy
focusing on these lawbreakers alone.
Cigarette smuggling is an area of activity in which
customers, traders and the industry are implicated
in a blurring of moral as well as geographical
boundaries. All the indications are that the scale of
the trade is considerable and that prevention and
enforcement have some way to go before they
‘‘make a difference’’. The problem is however
recognised by the public sector and also by the
industry concerned. Action by the public sector is
motivated by the loss of tax incomes related to
smuggling and also by concerns from law enforce-
ment agencies that this form of smuggling may be
linked with other forms of criminality within and
surrounding the European Union, and the poten-
tial nexus with terrorism (see for example the EU
Organised Crime Report 2005 (OCR), Crimorg
117, Brussels, 17 November 2005 and the EU
Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2006
(OCTA), Crimorg 94, Enfopol 115).1 Irrespective
of the role of the tobacco industry in the illicit
tobacco trade,2 they now face losses running into
hundreds of millions of Euros in income and have
become reputationally compromised by the devel-
opment of a parallel supply chain that is swamping
and endangering legal distribution channels.3 4 The
uncertain make-up of counterfeited cigarettes may
pose risks to public health in addition to the
known dangers of licit cigarettes. Faced with these
issues—but also with a great degree of uncertainty
over the forms taken by cigarette smuggling—both
public and private actors are seeking insights into
the forms of criminality involved and the condi-
tions that facilitate them.
In past decades, considerable research has been
conducted into the organisation of the legal and
illegal cigarette markets. Cigarette smuggling has
been described as a highly lucrative and somewhat
complex2 result of actions (and non-actions) by the
industry,5–7 criminals,8 policy makers9–11 and enfor-
cement agencies.12 The phenomenon has an expli-
cit international dimension13 and follows specific
patterns14 and routes,15 yet it is influenced only to a
limited extent by price and tax differentiations
within the market.2
The scope of this paper is limited to an
assessment of the Belgian role in the illicit cigarette
trade. This country plays a pivotal role in the
distribution sector within the European Union,
because of its geographical location and also
because its main port, Antwerp (one of the largest
ports in the world), is also said to be an attractive
operating base for smugglers.2 We address the
following questions: what is the role of Belgium in
the illicit cigarette trade? Who are the smugglers,
and does their reality correspond with the one that
is pictured in media and governmental reports?
How do they transport their contraband, and what
routes do they follow? Finally, what lessons can be
drawn to contribute to preventive strategies, and
more specifically, how could this information
contribute to the development of a protocol on
illicit tobacco trade?
METHODS
Data collection
The data used for this paper was collected during a
study carried out for the European Commission in
the context of a project called ‘‘Assessing
Organised Crime: testing the Feasibility of a
Common European Approach in a Case Study of
the Cigarette Black Market in the EU’’ (project
CIS8-CT-2004-501767 financed by the European
Commission under the Sixth Framework pro-
gramme, within the framework of the specific
research and technological development pro-
gramme ‘‘Integrating and strengthening the
ERA’’). As a partner in this European project,
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Ghent University undertook an analysis of 44 different Belgian
customs (30) and public prosecution (14) files concerning the
illegal cigarette trade in the period from 2000 to 2006. In
Belgium there are no files specifically labelled as cigarette
smuggling files. The investigators in charge of cigarette
smuggling cases provided a list of all cases known to them. In
order not to compromise ongoing investigations, access to 13 of
the 27 prosecution cases was denied. Access was granted to all
customs files.
After being granted access to the files, the files were studied at
the different Public Prosecutor’s offices or at the registry. Eleven
interviews with law enforcement representatives were con-
ducted and one with a private sector representative (British
American Tobacco, London, UK). The interviews helped us to
learn more about the Belgian cigarette black market and
provided some background information that assisted us in
orientating our focus and in sifting through the case files in a
productive manner. In order to capture the variety of
phenomenon under study, we opted for diversity in our
selection of cases. We therefore included cases involving only
cigarette smuggling, cases also involving other crimes, cases
involving genuine cigarettes and counterfeits, cases involving
both solo individuals and groups, and cases with both local and
broader international dimensions. Concerning the timeframe,
we focussed on the period from 2000 to 2006 (one case did start
before the year 2000, but as this case was still pending and the
suspects committed offences until 2003, the file was included in
the case analysis; table 1). In total, we analysed 30 cases at the
customs office and 14 at the Public Prosecutor’s office. In those
44 case files, 251 persons were mentioned. Eight persons figured
in more cases so, after correction of this double counting, 243
persons were identified in the files studied.
Generally, there are two avenues through which cigarettes are
supplied to the black market: bootlegging, and large scale
smuggling of brand-named or counterfeited cigarettes.16 While
bootleggers actually pay excise taxes (while purchasing cigarettes
in a country or region where taxes are low), large scale smugglers
try to avoid excise taxes entirely.16 Bootlegging is said to be
encouraged by substantial differences in the price of tobacco
products between neighbouring countries or between neighbour-
ing states or provinces. Bootlegging is often organised by ‘‘gangs’’,
but would not require huge investment as cigarettes are
transported by car or van. As profits increase when larger amounts
of cigarettes are being sold, bootleggers attempt to maximise the
number of cigarettes transported. Large-scale smugglers strive to
transport as many cigarettes as possible at once by using trucks or
containers. This might require a higher level of investment and a
more complex and well organised network.17
RESULTS
Belgium as a transit country in the heart of Europe
When analysing the case files, it is significant that most
contraband was not meant to be sold on the Belgian market,
but was meant for onward transport, which is encouraged by
geographical and policy factors. Belgium is situated in the heart
of Europe and is located on the smuggling routes from east to
west and south to north. Moreover, being close to the UK,
Belgium is a very attractive country for cigarette smugglers.
Consequently, warehouses in Belgium are often used to stock
illegal cigarettes. As for policy, penalties in Belgium are rather
low, and this may contribute to this county’s frequent
involvement in cigarette smuggling. For fiscal fraud, a prison
sentence of maximum 1 year can be imposed in Belgium, while
in other countries (eg, Italy), a person can receive up to 15 years
imprisonment (information from CDGEFID (directory of the
fight against economic and financial crime), the special branch
of the Belgian Federal Police responsible for investigations
concerning cigarette smuggling, 22 April 2004).
The nature of the contraband
Smuggled cigarettes are mostly not related to ‘‘home’’ brands
originating from Southern European countries, but are related
to expensive international brands.2 During the case file analysis,
a total of 17 brands could be identified: Superkings, Silk Cut,
Regal, Lambert & Butler, Sovereign, Marlboro, Golden Virginia,
Drum, Winston, Carlton, Fame, Belga, Bastos, Benson &
Hedges, Raquel, Dorchester, Mayfair and L&M. Seven of them
belong to the top 10 of most popular brands in the UK
(table 2).18 The most recurrent brands in the case files are: Regal
(23 times), Superkings (18 times), Sovereign (15 times),
Marlboro (14 times) and Benson & Hedges (7 times).
Just 5 out of 44 cases were concerned with cigarettes with
valid fiscal seals. In four cases, counterfeited cigarettes were
smuggled together with genuine cigarettes. In 15 cases, the files
did not indicate whether the cigarettes were counterfeit or not.
This leaves 20 cases where all of the cigarettes were described as
counterfeited (table 3).
These findings correspond with findings from the National
Customs Office. During the interviews, it was repeatedly
mentioned that the market share of counterfeit cigarettes has
increased in recent years and will probably continue to do so.19
No one knows which and to what extent substances more toxic
than in branded cigarettes are present in counterfeits. Most
counterfeited cigarettes originate from non-EU countries such
as China and Russia. In all cases with China as country of
origin, the counterfeited cigarettes carried the brand Marlboro.
Profiling the smuggler
Until today, little information has been published on the
individuals involved in cigarette black market activities.20 van
Duyne and von Lampe conducted research concerning the
indigenous cigarette black market in respectively The
Netherlands and Germany. Both also investigated smuggler
profiles.14 15
Since Belgium can be characterised as a transit country, it
appears to have more in common with the situation in The
Netherlands (primarily a transit country) than with the state of
affairs in Germany (which is often the final destination). In the
44 cases we studied, of the 243 persons, 10 were women. These
women appear to perform various functions within the
collective: car owner, company owner, smuggler; though most
were subsidiary functions. As for age, it is commonly observed
that ‘‘petty’’ or ‘‘volume’’ crimes such as theft peak between
adolescence and adulthood and then begin to decline.21 For
Table 1 Numbers of case files studied, by years in which cases started
Year 1997* 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
n 1 3 2 6 10 10 10 2
*One case did start before the year 2000, but as this case was still pending and the suspects committed further offences until 2003, the file was included in the case analysis.
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serious economic crimes, however, which are more demanding,
the peak lies in another modal age class. Several examples of this
can be found in the literature.22 23 This also appears to be true for
cigarette smugglers. The modal age of those in the files studied
is between 35 and 45 years, the vast majority of the suspects
being 35 years or older. A total of 59 people were older than 45,
while only 14% were younger than 30. The average age was 40
ranging, from 18 to 73 (table 4). These results are very similar to
van Duyne’s findings.
Law enforcement agencies, policymakers, the media and the
general public show a lot of interest in criminal networks
consisting of individuals connected with each other through
family loyalty24 or the presence of a ‘‘godfather’’ figure.25 A
number of elements often referred to are nationality, residence,
family ties, division of tasks and the existence of a criminal
record. Our analysis of these elements does not confirm this
stereotypical ‘‘mafia’’-like picture.
As regards the nationality of the smugglers, the majority of the
suspects (94) were of Belgian nationality. The nationality of 51
individuals could not be established with certainty on the basis of
the file information. The other 98 non-Belgian persons covered 23
nationalities. Three nationalities were predominant: 19% were
British, 17% Dutch and 12% Polish. The frequent occurrence of
Polish and Dutch suspects can be explained by the fact that The
Netherlands and Poland are attractive transit countries. The
predominance of British offenders can be explained by the fact that
the UK is very often the end customer.14 15
Concerning possible family ties, it appeared that relatives were
involved in only eight cases. Two of these cases concerned twin
brothers. Other cases involved relationships between mother and
daughter, mother and son, father and son, husband and wife and
between brothers. This implies either that family is not greatly
involved in cigarette smuggling, or that the investigations may
have missed information on this aspect; we have no view on this.
Although the cigarette smugglers are clearly involved in criminal
activities and maintain contacts with others who behave similarly,
according to the files they do not often appear to have a pevious
criminal record. However, one should be cautious about drawing
conclusions from this. The absence of a criminal past in the files
may indicate a gap in data collection and processing. According to
other sources, people involved in smuggling activities do have
criminal backgrounds, and the first time that a person appears in
the files of an investigation or prosecution agency would not
necessarily correspond with their first offence.26
Because of the type of illegal activities they undertake, cigarette
smugglers are often obliged to form a ‘‘group’’ and work together
with other criminals.27 In his study of the Dutch cigarette black
market, van Duyne distinguishes local traders, international
traders, intermediaries and professional transporters.14 Local
traders are entrepreneurs with no or limited administrative skills
and no professional experience in international trading. The
international traders, by contrast, operate within multinational
networks. This requires a minimum level of skill or access to other
professionals for the correct handling of the containers or trucks at
customs. Intermediaries are, according to van Duyne, not a specific
group of individuals, but focal points of networks consisting of
local traders as well as other, smaller intermediaries. They get the
merchandise on the market and are used to having assistants for
driving delivery vans, escort or storing the contraband, while these
assistants are also trading for themselves. The professional
transporters are legitimate licensed firms or one-man enterprises,
mainly involved in cross-border transporting of the contraband.
Based on the aforementioned classification, the extraction seen in
table 5 can be made.
The use of violence appears to be minimal, which confirms
van Duyne’s conclusions.14 Of course there are situations in
which threats are expressed, but real violence is rare. In the case
file analysis there was only one case in which there was a
suspicion of a murder in relation to the smuggling of cigarettes.
During the interviews, police officers surmised that the lack of
violence could also be related to the minimal control that is
directed towards this activity; consequently, smugglers have no
real reason or need to use violence.26
Transport, routes and entrepreneurial involvement
Cigarettes are not heavy, but they are voluminous. In Belgium,
cigarettes are often smuggled via road transport, by trucks and
ordinary passenger cars (ie, non-transport specialised).28
Bootleggers frequently use cars or vans to get their cigarettes
abroad. Of course, when a criminal group is involved, cars may be
used to guide trucks to warehouses or to observe police actions. In
11 cases in the files studied, cars were used. However, the most
current means of transportation via the road is by truck and/or
trailer. This occurred in 32 out of the 44 cases. The use of a
container occurred 13 times and 8 times a ship was used. In the
latter cases, the seizure took place at the port in Antwerp where
the containers would then be further transported by truck. In
some cases multiple means of transportation were used. Table 6
shows a breakdown of transport modes.
Table 2 Top 10 UK cigarette brands, 200418
Rank Brand name Share of UK cigarette market (%) Manufacturer
1 Lambert & Butler KS 13.5 Imperial Tobacco
2 Benson & Hedges Gold 7.3 Gallaher
3 Mayfair King Size 7.1 Gallaher
4 Richmond Superkings 6.6 Imperial Tobacco
5 Richmond King Size 4.9 Imperial Tobacco
6 Marlboro Gold King Size 4.4 Philip Morris
7 Regal KS 3.5 Imperial Tobacco
8 Royals King Size Red 3.4 British American Tobacco
9 Superkings 3.3 Imperial Tobacco
10 Silk Cut Purple 3.2 Gallaher
Table 3 Authenticity
Authenticity n Percentage
Genuine and counterfeited cigarettes 4 9.1%
Genuine cigarettes 5 11.4%
Counterfeited cigarettes 20 45.4%
Unknown 15 34.1%
Total 44 100%
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Van Duyne14 and von Lampe15 found that there is an
interaction between cigarette crime-entrepreneurs and legiti-
mate entrepreneurs. Analysis of the case files revealed the
involvement of as many as 152 legal businesses. In only five
cases were no legal enterprises apparently involved. Based on
the data presented in the files, it was not possible to ascertain
the nature of involvement of the implicated enterprises.
The strong interaction between legal companies and the
illegal entrepreneurs is striking. van Duyne concluded that the
complicity of legal enterprises in cigarette smuggling activities
points to the prevalence of a kind of moral absent-mindedness
where people perceive cigarette smuggling as a ‘‘lesser’’ crime.14
The private tobacco sector, public officials, private entities and
consumers do not feel that they are taking part in an essentially
criminal business.
In 28 cases, use was made of legal transport companies. In all
cases the transport companies were set up as legal companies and
undertook, besides their fraudulent actions, legal transport work.
Truck drivers were approached at night at parking places and were
asked if they were willing to transport cigarettes to the UK along
with their legal cargo in exchange for remuneration.
Since Belgium is a transit country, a lot of cigarettes are
imported to warehouses.2 From the case files it appears that in
25 cases, warehouses were being used to store the cigarettes
awaiting further transport. According to the literature, a lot of
warehouses located around the port of Antwerp serve as
stockpiling locations for contraband cigarettes.2
Getting hold of means of transportation is one thing, hiding
the cigarettes is another. A cover load can exist on paper only,
which means that the documents accompanying the transport
state that certain goods are stored in a truck or container, while
in reality there are just cigarettes. However, the most frequent
modus operandi used by the smugglers (in 30 cases of those
studied) is to create a ‘‘wall’’ of licit merchandise in the
transport vehicle, for example packages of cotton, with
cigarettes being hidden behind. Another modus operandi,
though only mentioned in three cases, is concealing the
cigarettes in secret compartments; the cigarettes are hidden in
the cover load or elsehwhere in the transport vehicle. We came
across some other techniques such as the use of aliaes,
falsification of documents, or setting up of sham companies
for money laundering, but these appeared infrequently in the
case files. Compared to techniques used in drug trafficking, the
methods of concealment used seem to be less sophisticated.29
Since transportation is crucial to the success of the cigarette
smuggling, it is no surprise that the vast majority of suspects
(n = 73) are employed as either truck drivers (n = 24) or business
managers, employees at transport companies or shipping agencies,
lessees of warehouses etc. (n = 49). Most of them knowingly and
willingly cooperate with the smuggling activities, according to the
prosecution and customs files. Study of the files shows that the
truck drivers first of all engage in legal activities, but in addition
also undertake one or more illegal transport jobs. The other group
mainly supplies logistic support, such as renting out depots. Some
offenders have official approval as managers of customs ware-
houses, and therefore on paper can legally store and forward
goods—but in reality set up smuggling networks.
In 17 cases, the origin of the cigarettes was a non-European
country. In nine of those cases, the cigarettes originated from
China. Other popular countries of origin are the United Arab
Emirates and the ex-Soviet Union. In 22 cases, the cigarettes
originated from a European country. Spain was, in the analysed
cases, the most popular European country of origin of the
cigarettes. In six cases there was no information on their
provenance.
Belgium is often cited as a transit country, and our case file
study naturally reflects this being drawn from Belgian sources.
In 29 cases Belgium is mentioned as a transit country. In seven
cases, the countries that the cigarettes passed through on route
is not mentioned. From the other cases, France, Germany and
The Netherlands are the most frequently mentioned countries.
The main smuggling route identified in the 44 cases is the
route from east to west. Only in four cases did cigarettes
originate from the south, destined for the north. The UK seems
to be a very popular final destination (25 cases). This percentage
is probably an understatement, as the destination country is
frequently not mentioned in the files. However, as in those files
the cigarettes are British brand-named cigarettes, it is reasonable
to suspect that they are destined for the British market too.
CONCLUSIONS
An effective strategy requires one to know with what and with
whom one is dealing. Based on case files of Belgian investigation
and prosecution agencies, it can be concluded that Belgium
mainly functions as a transit country for cigarette smuggling. In
the vast majority of cases, the UK is the destination country for
the cigarettes. This is no doubt the reason why most of the
smuggled cigarettes are British brands. China is the most
popular country of origin, especially for counterfeited cigarettes.
In the case files studied, several modus operandi used by the
criminals are mentioned. In almost all the cases, cover loads are
used during the transport of the cigarettes. The cigarettes are
mostly transported via the fine-meshed Belgian highway
network. Large-scale smugglers need larger means of transporta-
tion than bootleggers, and therefore often use trucks or
containers. The vehicles used for the transportation are in most
cases the property of legal companies involved in the smuggling
activities. Very often, warehouses are used to store the
cigarettes. In short, cigarette smuggling shows various links
with the legal businesses world.
A picture can be drawn of those typically involved in the
cigarette black market in Belgium. It concerns a man of 40 years
old with Belgian nationality. He lives legally in Belgium and is
probably involved in large scale smuggling activities as an
Table 4 Age
Age classes n Percentage
.45 59 24.3%
35–45 74 30.4%
30–34 32 13.2%
,30 34 14.0%
Unknown 44 18.1%
Total 243 100%
Table 5 Task division
Task n Percentage
Main local traders 7 6.5%
International traders 31 29.0%
Intermediaries 42 39.3%
Professional transporters 27 25.2%
Total (known) 107 100%
Known 107 44%
Unknown 136 56%
Total 243 100%
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intermediary. There is not much information in the files on his
ethnicity and economic and social background, and there is little
indication that his relatives are involved in these activities. Both
this study and the Dutch study show that the individuals
involved in cigarette smuggling appear to have a legitimate
business background, which may point to a certain prevalence
of some sort of moral absent-mindedness in which people
perceive cigarette smuggling as a ‘‘lesser’’ crime.
These bare facts are the ‘‘where’’, ‘‘how’’ and ‘‘who’’ of the
cigarette smuggling trade in Belgium, as known to the law
enforcement and prosecution agencies (or at least, as described
in the files made available to the researchers). We also know the
‘‘why’’, which is simple and readily understandable financial
motivation, ready markets, and relatively low levels of law
enforcement and penalties (compared with drug smuggling, for
example). Although countermeasures have not been the focus of
this study, our results may bring additional perspectives to
policy discussions on cigarette smuggling.
The issue of reduction (or rather ‘‘elimination’’) of the illegal
tobacco trade has, among others, been raised by the World
Health Organization. Article 15 of the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) deals with illicit trade
in tobacco products and urges the parties signing to undertake
action in order to eliminate illicit trade in tobacco products.
This article, however, is considered to be too unspecific to be
fully effective, therefore needing a supplementary protocol.30 In
the meantime, an expert group drafted a template for a protocol
recommending certain provisions to WHO FCTC article 15.31
Some of the provisions are: control of the supply chain through
licensing, anti-money-laundering measures, a tracking/tracing
system to allow authorities to keep records of all shipments,
security and preventive measures (remains vague except for civil
penalties for manufacturers who do not properly control their
supply chain), enhanced law enforcement capacity (sufficient
trained officers, intelligence-controlled policing, state of the art
detection and surveillance technologies, training programmes),
penalisation, confiscations, seizure of assets, special enforce-
ment techniques, information sharing etc.
By doing this, the expert group seems to have chosen for a
‘‘law and order’’ approach in tackling the illegal tobacco trade,
concentrating on technical preventive measures, data collection
and sharing, criminalising and penalising. Without doubt, these
aspects fit in a global strategy against the illicit tobacco trade.
The results of our empirical study, however, can be used as an
argument to opt for a more comprehensive approach. According
to our findings, cigarette smuggling is not a crime phenomenon
that can be located in the ‘‘underworld’’, but has many
connections to the legitimate business and legal world. In such
cases, counterstrategies would best go beyond mere repressive
actions and include general and selective preventive32 aspects,
with a broader spectrum.33 One could include general preven-
tion actions concentrating, for example, on spatial aspects of
parking spaces for truck drivers (the place where many legal and
illegal activities meet), or on public awareness raising awareness
of the consequences of purchasing smuggled cigarettes (buyers
of smuggled cigarettes do not feel engaged with ‘‘real crime’’ at
present). At a selective prevention level, target hardening
measures focusing on the detection of risk offenders or potential
crime-facilitating opportunities are proposed in the draft
protocol. Given the legal/illegal nexus, one could go further on
this point and use the results of vulnerability studies of relevant
economic sectors (eg, the transport sector), to detect weak
points in the economic environment that might be exploited by
criminals active in cigarette smuggling (eg, the problems related
to recruitment of lorry drivers, financial pressures on small
transport companies etc.).34
In summary, our findings are that the Belgian cigarette
smuggling sphere is a complex, ambiguous phenomenon involving
several legal and illegal participants, and that the transit of
cigarettes across the licit/illicit divide is paralleled by the moral
careers of those who smuggle the goods, not to mention those who
consume them. From the legal world to the illegal and back again,
this trade and its practitioners and customers blur the line between
criminality and non-criminality, adding to the perception that
some laws are ‘‘ok’’ to be broken.
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